VCs like to see that a startup has competition. The standard reason given is that the presence of competition validates that a market exists. This is true, but competition is a key signal of a market's maturity, not only its size. Your product might solve a huge problem for a large market, but if your customers have never seen anything like it, you are going to have to spend tremendous amounts of money educating the market.
Netflix recently provided a great example of this. On last week's earnings call, Netflix CFO David Wells blamed a lack of competition for their sluggish growth in Latin America. From GigaOm: "Without other companies showing local consumers that “streaming video actually works,” Netflix endures the entire burden of marketing an consumer education [sic]." [1]
[1] http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/gigaom/articles/2012_05_16_netflix_cfo_really_we_didnt_kill_spongebobs_ratings.html
Occasional thoughts on my professional interests of digital media, technology, and the reindustrialization of the world; interspersed with even more occasional notes on my hobbies of linguistics, urban planning, New York, and cycling.
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
Sunday, May 20, 2012
How NY VCs Stay Humble
Me: I work in VC.
Girl: You work in DC?
Me: No, VC.
Girl: What are you doing up here?
Me: No, not DC. Venture Capital.
Girl: What's that?
Me: Nevermind.
Girl: I only date guys who work in finance.
Me: FML.
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
Four Things I’ve Learned from Founders
The best part of working in VC is the opportunity to learn
from the amazing entrepreneurs you meet (includes the ones we ultimately pass on). For me at least, that's why I got into the
business in the first place. This will hopefully be the first in a series of
posts on what I’ve learned from the many entrepreneurs whose companies I've looked
at, some of whose identities I hope to be able to reveal soon (wink, wink). Four of the best insights I've gotten from some great founders follow:
1.
Budget-Based
Pricing:
This is my favorite. I’ve seen a few startups take an approach to enterprise
sales that I call “budget-based pricing.” The idea, roughly, is to calculate
how much can I charge while staying under the expense limit of the individual
that I am selling to within the organization. If you are selling to Dell, you
are not selling to Dell the corporation. You are selling to the marketing
office, shareholder relations, production, etc. You are probably selling to an
even smaller part of that organization: the marketing department of a
particular product line, perhaps even in a particular geography. Once you’ve
drilled down to the discrete level at which you are selling, there’s one
individual who is your ultimate customer. Ask yourself: how much can that
individual authorize for a single purchase without having to get approval at a
higher level, and/or having to go through procurement? This is her budget
authority. Price at or below this, and she can make a unilateral decision.
Price above this, and maybe you can get more money per sale, but your sales
cycle will lengthen in proportion to the number of corporate layers you have to
go through – as will the risk that someone higher up who is less excited about your product than
your end buyer will cancel the sale altogether.
The most elegant use of this tactic is what I call “credit
card pricing.” If you can set your price to a level at which the buyer can
simply pull out his credit card, charge it and expense it later, not only have
you eliminated bureaucratic delays in your sale, but you’ve eliminated the
entire order-to-cash (OTC) cycle. This is the fastest way to close an
enterprise sale. When you are a large, mature company, with dozens of customers
and stable cash flow or financing to support long sales and OTC cycles, you can
afford to optimize for long-term income. When you are a startup, you have to
optimize for speed and cash.
If you don’t know your end buyer’s expense level, ask them!
Many of them will happily tell you, as if they really want your product it’s in
their interest to get their hands on it as soon as possible.
2.
Tiered
vs Transaction Pricing:
Transaction pricing based on an appropriate unit of measure
makes sense when the marginal costs associated with each unit of sale are
significant (e.g. cloud services or CPX advertising). The downside of transaction
pricing is that your customer will try to limit or game the number of
transactions they need, in order to keep their costs down. For example, if you
provide a fraud detection service, they will try to minimize the size of the
sample they test. This leads to lower revenue for you and a worse customer
experience for them. A flat-rate model with multiple tiers avoids this.
3.
Competitive
Dynamics of an App or Platform Strategy:
The revenue appeal of an app
strategy, or a platform upon which others can build apps, is relatively easy to
see (although harder to execute). Recently one founder explained the strategic
value of an app platform, namely how it shifts competitive market dynamics in
two important ways: many would be competitors will become app partners; while direct
competitors are forced to decide between going big or going home. This also
points to the risk inherent in the app platform strategy: you need to be ready to
go big as well if needed to maintain your app platform lead; nobody wants to
build for the number-two platform; while on the downside a platform with few
apps not worth much (see under: RIM).
4.
Avoid
Long-Term Contracts
It’s natural to get excited
when you’re offered a long-term contract. What great validation of demand for
your product! There is an advantage in fundraising to be able to point to
recurring revenue, but from an operating perspective it’s better to sign a
one-year contract and then renegotiate for higher prices once the year is out. Your
negotiating leverage as an early stage company will be dramatically higher then.
Yes, this introduces some risk that they won’t renew, but they wouldn’t be
offering you a three-year contract if they didn’t really like your product. To
use the fundraising analogy, giving a discount to your earliest customers make
sense, but letting them keep that discount for three years would be like giving
your seed investors the right to participate in the A and B rounds, but at the
seed valuation.
Saturday, May 5, 2012
The Alarming Self-Righteousness in Tech
There is a growing self-righteousness in the tech community,
and like any other self-righteousness, it is ugly. The latest example that I’ve
seen of this is the manifesto
published by Karma, a Techstars NY company with a vision of more user-friendly
mobile service. Don’t get me wrong – I agree that the telecom industry has
stagnated and that somebody needs to shake it up, and I applaud Karma’s broader
goals – but revisionist history and framing ourselves as the “good guys” in a
battle between good and evil makes me uneasy about what lies ahead.
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